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Abstract
This article explores some of the ways in which marine genetic resources conceptually and normatively 
intersect with the concept and idea of commons. Through an analysis of the terminological ambiguities 
and semantic slippages characterizing the usage of the concept of commons in international law, the ar-
ticle addresses questions relation to the idea of global commons and to the multiple reciprocal mapping 
of concepts, categories and legal regimes (can the different existing inflections of the idea of commons 
be considered articulations of the same underlying concept? What legal categories are associated with 
the multiple inflections and articulations of the concept of commons? What legal regime(s) do they, or 
should they, refer to?) The analysis shows that the commons is best understood as a narrative, which 
is then unpacked, in order to illustrate how it links in multiple ways to an ensemble of legal categories 
and legal regimes. Finally, the article explores how do marine genetic resources fit in this conceptual and 
normative narrative, in order to map the applicable regimes, and examine whether, to which extent, and 
in what ways, marine genetic resources are, can and/or should be considered as commons.
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1. Introduction
The concept of commons has gained increasing prominence in the context of international law, as 
areas beyond national jurisdictions have come under increasing economic and environmental pres-
sure, and as global natural processes and even resources located in domestic jurisdictions have begun 
acquiring a public interest dimension. Two key examples are climate change and the conservation 
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of biodiversity, both legally characterized as common concern of humankind.1 Moreover, even the 
very ecological balance of the global environment has been recognized as a common interest of the 
international community, or, more precisely, an ‘essential interest’ of all States.2 Some commentators 
see this as the signal of an ongoing process of emergence of an ‘international public law.’3 This public 
inflection of international law, Ellen Hey suggests, is characterized by the superimposition of ‘com-
mon-interest normative patterns’ over more traditional ‘inter-state normative patterns.’4 
However, the concept of commons finds in international law a multiplicity of semantic inflections, 
conceptual configurations and legal articulations. The very mention of commons in an international 
legal context immediately brings to mind the notion of the traditional global commons, that is, the 
high seas, the atmosphere, Antarctica and outer space. Yet, a series of other domains or areas that 
fall outside of national jurisdiction, as well as of resources, processes, rights regimes and even obli-
gations, are increasingly characterized as commons. The legal regimes applicable to these ‘commons’ 
are however different, and sometimes significantly so. These commons in fact intersect in ambigu-
ous, confusing and sometimes even contradictory ways5 with both the underlying legal categories 
(res communes, res nullius, res publicae, etc.)6 and the multiplicity of semantics and conceptual inflec-
tions the concept of commons may take: common areas, common good, common goods, common 
interest, common concern, common heritage, community of interest, common responsibility, etc. 
Moreover, the same resource can be enfolded by several of these inflections at once or enfolded dif-
ferently in relation to its jurisdictional location.
One exemplary instance of the latter case is offered by marine genetic resources. At the time of 
writing, the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on Oceans and Law of 
the Sea has just concluded. One of the central points on the agenda was the report of the Preparatory 
1 Respectively, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 
March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCCC) preamble, recital 1, and Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, 
entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79 (CBD) preamble, recital 3.
2  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7 [53]. See also ‘Eighth Report on State 
responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur - the internationally wrongful act of the State, source of international 
responsibility (part 1)’ (1980) UN Doc A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7, 27 [33].
3  Bruno Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’ (2009) 20 EJIL 265, 268; Vaughan 
Lowe, ‘The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing?’ in Michael Byers (ed), The 
Role of Law in International Politics. Essays in International Relations and International Law (OUP 2000); Ellen Hey, ‘Interna-
tional Institutions’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmen-
tal Law (OUP 2008).
4  Ellen Hey, quoted in Jutta Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern’ in Bodansky, Brunnée 
and Hey (n 3) 552. See also Hey (n 3).
5  See eg Kathryn Milun, The Political Uncommons: The Cross-cultural Logic of the Global Commons, (Ashgate 2011).
6  See, in particular, Alberto Miele, ‘“Res Publica”, “Res Communis Omnium”, “Res Nullius”: Grozio e le Fonti Romane sul 
Diritto del Mare’ (1998) 26 Index 383.
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Committee (PREPCOM), submitted in July 2017.7 UNGA had established the PREPCOM in 2015, 
with the mandate to prepare substantive recommendations on the elements of a draft text of an inter-
national legally binding instrument (ILBI) under the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national juris-
diction (ABNJ).8 On 24 December 2017, UNGA adopted a resolution convening a formal intergov-
ernmental conference to negotiate and adopt an ILBI on such urgent theme.9 One of the four topics 
included in the negotiating agenda is marine genetic resources (MGRs), including the sharing of 
benefits arising from their utilization. Key issues under discussion with regard to MGRs, throughout 
the BBNJ process,10 and especially during the PREPCOM meetings,11 involve the nature of MGRs, 
the regime that does and/or should govern them, and important definitional aspects. Interestingly, 
in the PREPCOM report, MGRs figure prominently in section B, which outlines the items on which 
negotiating delegations could reach neither consensus nor convergence of views in the course of the 
four preparatory meetings.12 In particular, ‘further discussions’ are deemed required and necessary 
in relation to the question of whether MGRs could or should be considered the common heritage of 
mankind (CHM), or whether they do (and should) fall under the freedom of the high seas regime. 
The resolution of this juxtaposition is likely to affect in important ways the legal regime of MGRs in 
ABNJ, both from a principled and from a practical perspective.13 
Against this background, this article will explore some of the ways in which MGRs conceptually 
and normatively intersect with, and are articulated through, the concept of commons. The termi-
nological ambiguities and semantic slippages characterizing the usage of the concept of commons 
in international law, however, lead naturally to a number of preliminary questions. What are global 
7  UNGA, ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee established by General Assembly resolution 69/292: Development of an 
international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction’ (2017) UN Doc A/AC.287/2017/PC.4/2 
(PREPCOM Report).
8  UNGA Res ‘Development of an international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction’ (19 
June 2015) UN Doc A/RES/69/292 [1(a)].
9  UNGA Res ‘International legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the 
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction’ (24 December 2017) UN 
Doc A/72/249.
10  Which can be said to have started with the establishment of the Ad Hoc Informal Working Group to study issues relating 
to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction: UNGA Res 59/24 
‘Oceans and the law of the sea’ (17 November 2004) UN Doc A/RES/59/24.
11  For a review of the steps of the BBNJ process up to PREPCOM II see, eg Ronán Long and Mariamalia Rodríguez Chaves, 
‘Anatomy of a New International Instrument for Marine Biodiversity beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2015) 23(6) Environmen-
tal Liability 213; see also Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), ‘Summary of the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Committee 
on Marine Biodiversity beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction’ (Volume 25, Number 141, 24 July 2017).
12  Section B in fact ‘highlights some of the main issues on which there is divergence of views’, PREPCOM Report (n 7) 
[38(a)].
13  Section B included also other, more specific points related to MGRs, such as the nature of MGRs, clearly linked to the 
previous point of divergence, and other questions linked to benefit sharing, access and the appropriate forum for addressing 
questions related to intellectual property rights: ibid Section B, 17.
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commons? Can the different existing inflections of the idea of commons be considered articulations 
of the same underlying concept? What legal categories are associated with the multiple inflections 
and articulations of the concept of commons? What legal regime(s) do they, or should they, refer to? 
What type of resources can, or should, be qualified as commons? Exploring some of these questions 
will serve to prepare the terrain for exploring the legal status of MGRs, the relevant legal regime(s), 
and discuss these questions in the context of the ongoing BBNJ process. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the concept of commons in international law, 
in order to illustrate many, if not all, of its articulations and semantic as well as legal inflections. The 
discussion leads to re-characterizing the commons as a narrative, rather than as a concept. The idea 
of narrative, I suggest, is forgiving, and its flexible contours are better able to accommodate the many 
inflections and articulations of the commons. Section 3 unpacks the narrative of the commons, in 
order to illustrate how the same narrative links in multiple ways to an ensemble of legal categories 
and legal regimes. Section 4 discusses MGRs, their legal status and regime(s), and examine whether, 
to which extent, and in what ways, MGRs are, can and/or should be considered as commons. Finally, 
section 5 draws some conclusions.
2. Unpacking the Concept of the Commons in International Law
The concept of the commons traverses international law in multiple ways, both diachronically and 
synchronically. It traverses international law’s historical development, intertwined with the antago-
nistic concept of proprium, in both its private and public forms: ownership and sovereignty.14 It trav-
erses international law’s conceptual and theoretical space, through a series of normative vectors that 
deploy the conceptual and semantic referent of the ‘commons’ in different, and sometimes incompat-
ible, ways.15 It traverses, finally, international law’s structural framework in problematic ways through 
the emerging ecological paradigm, which unsettles the linear spatial and legal boundaries of interna-
tional law and points to an inherent, unavoidable ecological commonality modern international law 
14  The relation between communis and proprium embodies a biopolitical dialectic (always oscillating back and forth in a 
Nietzschean way, never resolved in a Hegelian synthetic fashion) crucial to modernity (see in this respect Roberto Esposito, 
Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy (University of Minnesota Press 2008), and unfolds in a multiplicity of ways in the thought and 
work of many key international jurists in the early stages of modern international law, see eg Gustavo Gozzi, Diritti e Civiltà. 
Storia e Filosofia del Diritto Internazionale (Il Mulino 2010). However, modern international law has been said to embody and 
operationalize a juridical logic that leads to the ‘uncommoning’ (that is, the colonial and, subsequently, commercial appropri-
ation) of the global and regional commons, Milun (n 5) 49.
15  On this particular question, see eg Milun (n 5) especially chapter 2.
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may not be fully able to accommodate, despite ongoing attempts.16 Additionally, resources and areas 
beyond national jurisdiction (that is, global commons) are increasingly at the centre of legal debates 
in light of their (potential or actual) economic and ecological significance. This is evident from key 
international legal regimes (such as the climate regime)17 and from novel negotiating processes (such 
as the BBNJ process).18 In this respect, ideas of commons, in their various articulations, are located, 
as aptly observed, at the ‘juncture of legal framework, sovereign discretion, collective interest and 
normative obligation,’19 and provide ‘a site within which disputes about development and conserva-
tion are being played out.’20 
With regards to the law of the sea, global commons have a special significance. Indeed, two key 
areas framed traditionally (and despite their significantly different legal regimes), as commons, are 
marine areas: the high seas and the deep-sea bed in areas beyond national jurisdiction (the ‘Area’).21 
It is, however, within the context of international environmental law that the concept of commons 
has had its most significant expansion in recent decades.22 Indeed, some commentators have noted 
how ‘[t]he environmental protection agenda has successfully recast “the commons” in terms of global 
commons,’ which in turn has become ‘a powerful political tool, but also an accurate depiction of the 
interdependence of ecological systems.’23
16  Ecology seems to demand a re-design of the international legal grid of sovereign jurisdictions (or lack thereof) around 
notions of ecosystem relations, in this sense expanding significantly the notion of ‘sharedness’. This is becoming especially 
apparent in the context of transboundary water resources, where the interests of non-riparian States begin to be recognized in 
light of the ecological interest these States may have in the resource (see eg Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes (adopted 17 March 1992, entered into force 6 October 1996) 1936 UNTS 269 
and Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (adopted 2 February 1971, entered 
into force 21 December 1975) 996 UNTS 245. Concepts such as common concern also try to bring into international environ-
mental law a ‘public law’ dimension (see eg Brunnée (n 4)).
17  Climate change having been defined in 2009 (by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon) and in 2014 (by Prince Charles 
of Wales) as the ‘greatest challenge’ humanity faces, see respectively Jon Swaine, ‘Ban Ki-moon warns of catastrophe without 
world deal on climate change’ (The Telegraph, 10 August 2009) <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/environment/climatech-
ange/6004553/Ban-Ki-moon-warns-of-catastrophe-without-world-deal-on-climate-change.html> accessed 1 April 2018, and 
Emily Godsen, ‘Prince Charles: climate change is the greatest challenge facing humanity’ (The Telegraph, 22 September 2014) 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/prince-charles/11110457/Prince-Charles-climate-change-is-the-greatest-challenge-fa-
cing-humanity.html> accessed 1 April 2018.
18  UN Doc A/RES/69/292 (n 8) see in particular [1].
19  Duncan French, ‘Common Concern, Common Heritage and Other Global(-ising) Concepts: Rhetorical Devices, Legal 
Principles or a Fundamental Challenge?’ in Michael Bowman, Peter Davies and Edward Goodwin (eds), Research Handbook 
in Biodiversity Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 334.
20  Jane B Holder and Tatiana Flessas, ‘Emerging Commons’ (2008) 17(3) Social & Legal Studies 299, 304.
21  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 
1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS) art 1(1)(1) states in this respect that the Area ‘means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.
22  Where the concept of commons plays for example a key role in framing issues and problems, Holder and Flessas (n 20) 
esp 304ff.
23  ibid 304.
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The broad discursive reach of the concept of the commons, as well as its semantic field and its 
critical legal significance remain, however, politically and legally ambiguous,24 and arguably under 
problematized.25 Additionally, the concept and language of the commons is also problematically used 
to refer to a variety of incommensurable legal categories and legal regimes,26 and is deployed in am-
biguous, imprecise, and sometimes even contradictory ways,27 as a number of semantic and concep-
tual slippages affects its deployment. The concept is for example, equally deployed in relation to open 
access28 and closed29 legal regimes. Moreover, the concept of commons is associated in various and 
sometimes ambiguous or imprecise ways with a number of (Roman) legal categories.30 
The category that probably has been more persistently associated with the global commons is that 
of res communes omnium. The category indicates a set of things – goods – common to all (communes 
omnium hominibus,31 that is, not falling under ownership of any individual, nor of any particular 
political community).  Traditionally res communes are the air, flowing water, the sea and its shores.32 
Res communes are openly, and legitimately, accessible by anyone, although the use must not impair an 
equivalent use by others.33 They can be regulated, but it is usually recognized that the category admits 
no lawful appropriation. In this respect, medieval jurists distinguished between ownership (unlaw-
24  Obviously, the doctrinal literature on, respectively, common heritage and common concern is voluminous. However, 
there is arguably little critical legal scholarship on these themes nor comprehensive studies on the notion of commons in 
international law. For an exception, see Milun (n 5) esp chapter 2. See also, particularly in relation to law of the sea and the 
Grotian tradition, Miele (n 6).
25  The distinction between common good and common goods has received very little attention and thus remains under-ex-
plored. However, the two concepts, as recent scholarship shows, refer to two distinct and possibly antagonistic theoretical and 
normative horizons, see eg Maria Rosaria Marella, ‘La Parzialità dei Beni Comuni contro l’Universalismo del Bene Comune’ 
(EuroNomade, 6 May 2014) <www.euronomade.info/?p=2282> accessed 23 March 2016. See also, specifically on global com-
mons, Milun (n 5). Moreover, resources considered common (whether common heritage or common concern) refer to a 
generic and universal referent (i.e. ‘mankind’ or ‘humankind’) whose conceptual and political delineation is, from a critical 
legal perspective, problematic. For a problematization of the use of humanity (or humankind) as a universal referent, see, in 
particular, Anna Grear, ‘Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on “Anthropocentric” Law and Anthropocene 
“Humanity”’ (2015) 26(3) Law and Critique 225.
26  In this sense probably referring to two distinct knowledge domains: economics and law.
27  Milun (n 5) 31 observes, for example, how the CBD at once defines nature (i.e. biodiversity) as a commons (common 
concern) and sets the conditions for its appropriation.
28  Such as the high seas and the atmosphere (through its genealogical relation with the concept of res communes omnium). 
The linkage with open access regimes is what enables the folding of the concept of commons under a narrative of resource 
management ‘tragedy’. For a seminal articulation of the argument, see Garret Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 
162(3859) Science 1243.
29  Such as the deep-sea bed, Antarctica or outer space (constructed as a common heritage of humankind and relating ge-
nealogically to the roman legal concept of patrimonium and, more remotely, possibly to the institute of consortium ercto non 
cito).
30  On this see, in particular, Miele (n 6).
31  Thus Celsus, D. 43.8.1.
32  ‘Et quidem naturali iure omnium communia sunt illa: aer, aqua profluens, et mare, et per hoc litora maris’, Marcianus, D. 
1.8.2(1).
33  An idea that in modern law of the sea was captured by the concept of ‘reasonable regard’ in the 1958 Convention on the 
High Seas (adopted 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 September 1962) 450 UNTS 11, and ‘due regard’ later in UNCLOS.
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ful), use (open to all) and jurisdiction (reserved to the emperor).34 The category of res communes 
omnium was, importantly, the legal basis for Grotius’ theoretical argument for the freedom of the 
sea, and indeed the category maps closely, though not entirely, with the current regime regulating the 
high seas.35 Res communes omnium is however intertwined in persistently confusing ways with the 
concept of common heritage of mankind,36 with the category of res nullius,37 and with the category 
of res publicae.38 In relation to the former, an unfortunate equivalence still persists between common 
heritage39 and res communes omnium,40 despite the fact that common heritage is rather linked to the 
legal category of patrimonium,41 which falls under the broader category of res in commercium.42 In 
relation to res nullius, Milun observes that, in international law, the rhetoric of res communes – that 
is the framing discourse of global commons – is ambiguously conflated and often transformed into 
a practice based on the category of res nullius.43 However, Milun, like arguably most contemporary 
commentators, does not address the fact that res communes omnium and res nullius have both the 
theoretical capacity to underpin particular inflections of the concept of commons.
The category of res nullius, and its associated terrestrial articulation terra nullius,44 has provided 
key intellectual resources, a legitimating discourse and persuasive legal arguments underpinning 
the colonial enterprise rationalized through international law.45 It also constitutes an important, if 
perhaps misguided, point of departure in at least some discussions of the idea of global commons. 
Vogler for example, who has written an influential book on global commons from an international 
relations perspective, suggests an equivalence between global commons, open access, res nullius and 
34  ‘quod mare est commune quo ad usum, sed proprietas est nullius, sicut aer est communis usu, proprietas tamen est 
nullius [...] sed iurisdictio est Caesaris et sic ista tria sunt diversa, s[cilicet] proprietas, usus, et iurisdictio et protectio’, Baldus, 
‘Pandectarum seu Digestum vetus iuris civilis tomus primus’, Venetiis 1581, p 51, quoted in Alessandro Dani, ‘Il Concetto 
Giuridico di “Beni Comuni” tra Passato e Presente’ (2014) 6 (Paper 7) Historia et ius 1, 8-9.
35  UNCLOS Part VII ‘The High Seas’.
36  Aaron X Fellmeth and Maurice Horwitz, Guide to Latin in International Law (OUP 2009) esp 250.
37  Milun (n 5) chapter 2.
38  Miele (n 6); we have seen also how international legal scholars have observed how the increasing significance of the 
concept of commons is the signal of an ongoing shift to public-interest patterns of normativity (Hey (n 3)).
39  For a lengthy treatment, see Kemal Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Kluwer 
Law 1998). For a more recent general overview, see John E Noyes, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture’ (2011-12) 40 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 447. See also Brunnée (n 4). The concept of common heritage 
has been described as simultaneously ‘all too often subject to imprecise and incautious usage’ and ‘little short of revolutionary’ 
(when translated into legal regimes, Michael Bowman, ‘Environmental Protection and the Concept of Common Concern of 
Mankind’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David Ong and Panos Merkouris (eds), Research Handbook on International Environmen-
tal Law (Edward Elgar 2010) 500.
40  Thus, Miele (n 6), but also Baslar (n 39) and Milun (n 5). For the inclusion of common heritage under the category of res 
communes, see eg Fellmeth and Horwitz (n 36) 250; indeed, the authors consider, oddly, the modern idea of common heritage 
and the roman legal category of res communes to encompass together ‘the high seas, Antarctica, or celestial bodies’: ibid 250.
41  See eg Mariachiara Tallacchini, Diritto per la Natura. Ecologia e Filosofia del Diritto (Giappichelli 1996).
42  The specificity of common heritage being rather the collective subject and holding title to common heritage resources, 
and the special governance arrangements.
43  Milun (n 5) 6.
44  An ‘infamous’ category in the history of international law, especially as seen from the perspective of postcolonial and 
decolonial studies and TWAIL scholarship, see eg Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law (CUP 2004).
45  See eg ibid and Milun (n 5).
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a primordial state of nature.46 Yet neither res nullius nor open access are necessarily the ‘original char-
acteristic’47 of the commons, contrary to Vogler’s suggestion (which somehow follows Hardin’s own 
conflation of commons and unregulated open access).48
What is important to note for our purposes though, is that while the category of res nullius refers to 
things that do not belong to anyone, it does not offer any normative indication, in and of itself, about 
whether or not said things may be lawfully appropriated. To understand the proprietary regime of 
a thing, therefore, something else is needed, another category that can interact with the category of 
res nullius in order to further define the legal regime of that particular thing. To clarify by way of an 
example, the general category of res nullius includes also the sub-categories of res sacrae, res religios-
ae, and res sanctae.49 None of them can be appropriated by anyone: they already belong, respectively, 
to the Gods, to the defunct (for example, in the case of a tomb), and to the Roman people (though 
under divine protection). Thus, they must remain in nullius bonis, as they are extra commercium, and 
cannot belong to the patrimonium of any private individual. Indeed, the category of res extra com-
mercium has a crucial place in the systematic taxonomy of things in Roman law. For reasons of space, 
and to avoid lengthy digressions, we cannot address this role here.50 What is important for present 
purposes, however, is that there is a historical, juridical and logical connection between global com-
mons and their double character of not being capable of appropriation by a single individual/State 
and being extra commercium.51 
The category of res nullius however, has a second, more familiar, dimension.52 Indeed, it is a key 
concept in relation to resources that, even when located in areas governed by a regime of res com-
munes omnium, can be appropriated. One example is that of marine living resources, where there is 
a material and legal cleavage between the idea of a fisheries or of a fish species, and the individual 
components.53 The former is a corpus ex distantinbus, and as such is perhaps best characterized as 
a res nullius in bonis, sed universitatis, that is, as not belonging to any individual person but to the 
46  John Vogler, The Global Commons: Environmental and Technological Governance (2nd ed, Wiley 2000) 4.
47  ibid.
48  Vogler, moreover, also considers that this problematic openness of global commons, have been avoided in international 
law of the sea through the concept of common property (which Vogler equates, even more problematically with res communis 
omnium): ibid.
49  Thus, Marcianus, D. 1.8.6.2: ‘Sacrae res et religiosae et sanctae in nullius bonis sunt’.
50  But see eg Paolo Maddalena, ‘L’Ambiente e le sue Componenti come Beni Comuni di Proprietà Collettiva della Presente 
e delle Future Generazioni’ (Diritto all’Ambiente, 29 December 2011) <www.dirittoambiente.net/file/vari_articoli_270.pdf> 
accessed 1 April 2018.
51  ibid esp 6.
52  Grotius indeed also understood this double inflection of the notion of res nullius. Grotius in fact distinguished those res 
nullius that can never be appropriated, from those res nullius that, not having ‘been marked out for common use’, could beco-
me the object of private ownership (these would be for example individual wild animals, denoted in Roman law as res ferae), 
Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas or The Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East Indian Trade (Ralph van 
Deman Magoffin tr, OUP 1916) 28.
53  A cleavage also operative in relation to biodiversity and its components 
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whole relevant (international, in our case) community.54 The individual components, on the other 
hand, belong to the category of res ferae, wild animals that falls within the category of res in commer-
cium, and can be lawfully appropriated through capture.55 This distinction is perhaps best appreciat-
ed through the regime regulating the conservation and utilization of marine living resources in the 
EEZ. In the EEZ coastal States in fact, while having sovereign rights to those resources, are also under 
a set of obligations regarding both their conservation and the utilization vis-à-vis third States and the 
international community. I am not suggesting this is in any way controversial (though this broader 
understanding of res nullius, faithful to Roman law, may be from a contemporary perspective). On 
the contrary. My point is merely that these are some of several illustrative examples of how the narra-
tive of the commons maps to a number of different legal categories.56 Moreover, and by contrast, the 
same legal category may map to a commons or to a privately appropriable good. 
3. From Concept to Narrative
In addition to what has been discussed thus far, there is an ongoing expansion of the semantic reach 
of the concept of commons in a multiplicity of directions. This further stretches the concept in ways 
that, I suggest, exceeds the ability of the concept to remain useful. This expanding reach is then more 
appropriately accommodated by referring to a narrative of the commons, insofar as its forgiving, flex-
ible contours can capture the many inflections and articulations of the commons. While traditional 
global commons refer to spaces or areas beyond national jurisdiction (as already identified as the 
high seas, the atmosphere, Antarctica and outer space), a multiplicity of novel articulations – juridi-
cal, but also moral and rhetorical – have appeared in recent decades. These make use of the semantics 
of the commons, but due to their heterogeneity, are better appreciated as articulations of a broad nar-
rative, rather than a precise deployment of a single well-delineated concept. The same consideration 
applies to the variability of the relationship between the (global) commons and the underlying legal 
categories, of which I have presented a brief illustration in the previous section. This multiplicity of 
semantic inflections, moreover, ambiguously refers to a different set of legal regimes. Thus, the high 
seas57 and the atmosphere are subject to a regime underpinned by the idea of freedom. The Area58 
54  Of course, there is also the question of physical non-excludability, see eg Richard Barnes, Property Rights and Natural 
Resources (Hart 2009) esp 22ff, and Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252, esp 269.
55  This distinction between the whole and its components is operating within the context of the CBD, where biodiversity as 
such is a common concern of humankind, while the individual components can be lawfully appropriated, subject only to the 
condition of sustainable use.
56  We have identified three: res communes omnium; patrimonium; res nullius. There is, further, a variety of partial overlaps 
or confusions, as well as normative claims, with other categories of Roman law such as res in public uso or res publicae, which, 
however, cannot be discussed here, again for reason of space and to avoid unnecessary digressions. See respectively Andrea Di 
Porto, Res in Usu Publico e Beni Comuni. Il nodo della Tutela (Giappichelli 2013) and Miele (n 6).
57  UNCLOS arts 87 and 116.
58  UNCLOS art 136, see also Preamble, recital 6.
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and the Moon59 are subject to a regime of common heritage. The concept of common heritage is also 
variously associated with Antarctica (albeit in a sui generis manner),60 with plant genetic resources,61 
with the human genome,62 and even with human rights.63 Outer space, moreover, while governed by 
a regime of freedom, is also considered as a common interest, and presents some of the characters 
associated with common heritage, particularly in its sui generis Antarctic articulation.64 Whales65 
and biodiversity66 are, in general, subject to both a regime of sovereignty and one of common con-
cern or interest. Additionally, as mentioned, the discourse of the commons has gained increasing 
prominence in the context of international environmental law. Indeed, both climate change67 and the 
conservation of biodiversity are considered global commons by way of their characterization as the 
59  The 1979 Moon Treaty, however, explicitly declares the moon to be ‘common heritage of mankind’ (art 11): Agreement 
Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 5 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 
1984) 1363 UNTS 3.
60  In The Antarctic Treaty (adopted 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961) 402 UNTS 71, preamble, there is 
no explicit mention of ‘common heritage’, but there is equivalent language, as Antarctica is characterized as the province of 
all mankind, like outer space. For a review of the different positions as regards Antarctica, and the differences between areas 
under frozen claims, and unclaimed areas, see eg Christopher Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff 
1992). See also eg Edward Guntrip, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Adequate Regime for Managing the Deep Se-
abed?’ (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 376. However, outer space is subject to a regime of freedom (with 
the limitation of peaceful utilization), while Antarctica is subject to a strict regime that prohibits most activities, and carefully 
regulates the few uses that are allowed (eg scientific research and more recently tourism). It is also worthy of note that some 
commentators consider that the Antarctic Treaty system is rather based on the principle of common concern, see eg Dina 
Shelton, ‘Common Concern of Humanity’ (2009) 1 Iustum Aequum Salutare 33.
61  Thus, Edwin Egede, ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ in Anthony Carty (ed), Oxford Bibliographies Online: International 
Law (OUP 2014), but for a contrary opinion, see Ikechi Mgbeoji ‘Beyond Rhetoric: State Sovereignty, Common Concern, and 
the Inapplicability of the Common Heritage Concept to Plant Genetic Resources’ (2003) 16(4) Leiden Journal of International 
Law 821. Plant genetic resources, however, are expressly defined as a common concern, International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (adopted 3 November 2001, entered into force 29 June 2004) 2400 UNTS 303 (PGRFA 
Treaty), preamble, recital 3. In this respect, I imagine that Egede follows Baslar, who authored a crucial work on common 
heritage, and suggested that common heritage and common concern are two sides of the same idea, if not the same concept, 
one applicable in ABNJ, and the other in areas within national jurisdiction, see Baslar (n 39) 106.
62  Egede (n 61).
63  ibid.
64  See UNGA Res 1721 (XVI) (20 December 1961) where the international community recognized ‘the common interest 
of all mankind to peaceful uses of outer space’ (preamble, recital 1), a recognition reiterated in UNGA Res 1962 (XVIII) (13 
December 1963) ‘Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Spa-
ce’. The consideration of outer space as a common interest was included also in the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 27 
January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967) 610 UNTS 205 (OST Treaty), which characterizes outer space as a ‘common 
interest’ (preamble, recital 2). The OST Treaty, however, lays out that both exploration and scientific investigation of outer 
space shall be free for all States (art I). Yet the OST Treaty also speaks of outer space as the ‘province of all mankind’ (art I) and 
lays out a prohibition of appropriation (art II), and of ‘peaceful purposes’ (art IV) as regards its utilization, characters often 
associated with a common heritage regime, or perhaps more broadly, idea. 
65  See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (adopted 2 December 1946, entered into force 10 November 
1948) 161 UNTS 72.
66  See UNGA Res 1721 (XVI) where the international community recognized ‘the common interest of all mankind to pea-
ceful uses of outer space’ (preamble, recital 1), a recognition reiterated in UNGA Res 1962 (XVIII).
67  The UN General Assembly indeed recognized that ‘climate change is a common concern of mankind, since climate is an 
essential condition which sustains life on earth’, UNGA Res ‘Protection of global climate for present and future generations 
of mankind’ (6 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/53 [1]; the UNFCCC recognizes the ‘change in the Earth’s climate and its 
adverse effects’ as a common concern, preamble, recital 1.
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‘common concern of humankind,’68 a concept which may or may not be distinguished from common 
interest.69  Plant genetic resources are also defined as a common concern.70 Moreover, the ecological 
balance of the global environment has been recognized as a common concern of the international 
community, or, more precisely, an ‘essential interest’ of all States.71 Common concern in this respect 
is a concretization of the novel public logic of publicization of international law Ellen Hey describes,72 
yet it shows how the concept of common and of public (by contrast precisely delineated and distin-
guished in the Roman legal taxonomy of things) overlap in possibly problematic ways.73 Finally, the 
narrative of the commons is also deployed in relation to international freshwater through the notion 
of ‘community of interest,’74 and global cooperation is tied to the narrative of the commons by way of 
the concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibility.’75 
To complicate matters further, each of these inflections refers back, in a variety of sometimes am-
biguous or imprecise ways, to underlying roman legal categories that have been used to construct 
arguments, buttress claims or otherwise lend legitimacy to novel political and legal articulations.76 
4. MGRs as Commons?
The two preceding sections have prepared the terrain for exploring whether, to which extent and in 
what ways MGRs intersect with and are enfolded by the narrative of the commons. Yet what I have 
illustrated in the preceding sections is admittedly a complex, and perhaps even confusing, picture. 
The question to ask now is how do MGRs fit in this picture? What sort of commons are MGRs? Are 
they commons at all? Should they be? What is their legal nature? Under which legal category do they 
belong? What legal regime is applicable, and under which material and legal circumstances?77 This 
68  CBD preamble, recital 3.
69  The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, eg by Bowman (n 39); Bowman also underlines how both terms have 
a generic and ‘narrative’ usage early on and acquire a more specific legal meaning with the Rio Conventions (ibid).
70  PGRFA Treaty, preamble, recital 3.
71  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (n 2).
72  Hey (n 3).
73  See esp Miele (n 6).
74  Indeed, the PCIJ recognized how the community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis for a common legal 
right, Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder [1929] PCIJ Series A No 23, 27. See also Stephen 
McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Non-Navigational Uses (2nd edn, OUP 2007).
75  Particularly in the context of the climate regime. See eg UNFCCC preamble and art 3.
76  This latter use of Roman law as a source of legitimacy was already widespread during the middle ages on the part of glos-
sators. In such cases substantive (as opposed to formal) fidelity to the roman legal categories or concepts was not a primary 
concern, see eg Paolo Grossi, L’Ordine Giuridico Medievale (Laterza 2006).
77  On the various proposals that have been put forward and discussed within the context of the BBNJ process as regards 
the legal regime that does or should encompass MGRs see eg Natalie Y Morris-Sharma, ‘Marine Genetic Resources in Areas 
beyond National Jurisdiction: Issues with, in and outside of UNCLOS’ (2017) 20(1) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law Online 71.
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section will endeavour to address some of these questions in two steps. First, I will briefly outline 
current definitions of MGRs and the state of the relevant debates (for example in relation to the 
scope and inclusivity of existing definitions), within the two primary contexts of reference, the CBD 
and the BBNJ process. This is important in order to understand both the limits of the subject matter 
and the complexities and uncertainties involved. The second step will review the ways in which the 
narrative of the commons and MGRs intersect and interact.
In the legal framework set out in the CBD, genetic resources are one of three levels of biological 
diversity. The CBD distinguishes in this respect ‘diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems,’78 where ‘within species’ indicates diversity at the genetic level. Moreover, the CBD offers 
a definition of both genetic material and genetic resources. Genetic material means ‘any material of 
plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity.’79 The expression 
genetic resources, on the other hand, refers to ‘genetic material of actual or potential value.’80 The 
difference between genetic material and genetic resources, in other words, hinges on economic value.
These definitions, however, are only a starting point, as there remains a number of open questions 
being considered and debated both within the context of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, and 
in the BBNJ process. One of these questions is whether the definition of genetic material does, or 
should, include also the notion of derivatives. A derivative is, according to Article 2(e) of the Nagoya 
Protocol, ‘a naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting from the genetic expression or me-
tabolism of biological or genetic resources, even if it does not contain functional units of heredity.’81 
A second and more difficult question is whether the definition of genetic resources should include 
genetic sequence data, that is, the genetic information in a digitalized form.
The material scope of the definition of genetic resources is indeed a controversial and contested 
matter, which remains under discussion in both the context of the Nagoya Protocol and the BBNJ 
process.82 However, the status of the discussion is significantly different. In the positive regime es-
tablished under the Nagoya Protocol, genetic resources include both genetic material, as defined 
in the CBD, and derivatives, as defined in the Nagoya Protocol itself. The scope of the inclusion of 
derivatives is however limited, as it does not include those naturally occurring biochemical com-
78  CBD art 2.
79  CBD art 2.
80  CBD art 2. In this respect, Art 2 also explicitly includes genetic resources within the broader definition of biological 
resources.
81  Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utili-
zation to the Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 29 October 2010, entered into force 12 October 2014) UNEP/CBD/
COP/DEC/X/1 (Nagoya Protocol) art 2(e). 
82  The key point of contention being the possibility that, should digital sequence data NOT be included in the relevant 
definitions, the entire benefit sharing agreement may be largely bypassed given the increasing importance of genetic sequence 
data in the development of commercial products based on MGRs, as well as the lack of material information of the origin of 
the genetic sequence data.
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pounds that are accessed independently of genetic resources.83 Digitalized genetic information on the 
other hand, are not currently included in the definition, albeit debates are still ongoing.84 The Nagoya 
Protocol is, however, only competent to regulate genetic resources that are located in areas within 
national jurisdiction, so its relevance for the purpose of this article, and for the BBNJ process more 
in general, is primarily that of a starting point for discussion,85 though it does not in any way exhaust 
or pre-empt definitional discussions under the BBNJ process, where, for example, the question of 
derivatives remains open.86
The second context of relevance in relation to the identification of the legal regime for MGRs is, evi-
dently, UNCLOS, which establishes the rules governing living marine resources in the different mari-
time zones, including areas beyond national jurisdiction. UNCLOS is indeed the legal framework of 
reference for the current BBNJ process, and hence for debating and deciding questions related to the 
legal regime of MGRs in ABNJ. As of yet, no definition has been agreed upon.87 There is arguably a 
certain likelihood that relevant definitions will refer to, or incorporate, the definitions already availa-
ble in the CBD. However, it is also true that there is a significant distance, among delegations, in rela-
tion to the question of whether to include, for the purposes of the benefit-sharing architecture to be 
adopted under the future BBNJ agreement, derivatives and, most especially, genetic sequence data, 
in the definitional scope of MGRs.88 Relatedly, there are different ideas as regards whether the defini-
tional questions, and the inclusivity of the definitional scope, should be agreed upon within a single 
negotiating context (namely the Nagoya Protocol); or whether discussions should be maintained 
separate, with the (unfortunate) consequence of a likely heterogeneity of the definitions adopted in 
the different contexts and legal regimes.
Having briefly reviewed the current questions related to the definitional scope of MGRs, it is now 
time to turn to the main question this section aims to address, that is, how the narrative of the com-
mons encompasses, intersects and interacts with MGRs. Since MGRs are but one of the three levels of 
83  This can be inferred by a combined reading of Art 15 of the CBD and Art 2 of the Nagoya Protocol: Thomas Greiber and 
others, ‘An Explanatory Guide to the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing’ (2012) IUCN Environmental Policy and 
Law Paper No 83, 70.
84  See eg COP Decision XIII/16 ‘Digital sequence information on genetic resources’, CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/16, which es-
tablished an Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Digital Sequence Information on Genetic Resources with the mandate to 
assess ‘potential implications of the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources for the three objectives of the 
Convention and the objective of the Nagoya Protocol and implementation to achieve these objectives’ [1].
85  Indeed the definitions of both the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol have been referred and included by many delegations in 
submissions and also in the Chair’s draft non-papers throughout the PREPCOM, as well as in the ‘Chair’s streamlined non-pa-
per on elements of a draft text of an international legally-binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction’, 6 <www.
un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/Chairs_streamlined_non-paper_to_delegations.pdf> accessed 1 April 2018.
86  eg Japan and USA suggested a definition of genetic material that does not include derivatives (nor genetic sequence data, 
that is digitalized information), eventually reflected in Chair’s streamlined non-paper (n 85) 6 [40]. This definition was also 
included as option 3: ibid 6-7. 
87  Though there are several options on the table, Chair’s streamlined non-paper (n 85) 6-7.
88  ibid.
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biodiversity, it will be expedient to begin by looking at how the narrative of the commons intersects 
more generally with biodiversity tout court. In order to do that, we need to briefly look at the early 
stages of the CBD negotiations, as indeed already prior to the intergovernmental conference that 
led to the adoption of the CBD, the narrative of the commons was an important and controversial 
element in relation to how to frame the legal status of biodiversity.
The first steps towards the adoption of the CBD were taken in 1987, when the Governing Council of 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) decided to call upon UNEP to convene an Ad 
Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity to explore the ‘the desirability and possible 
form of an umbrella convention to rationalize current activities in [the field of biological diversity], 
and to address other areas which might fall under such a convention’.89 The proposal for a compre-
hensive instrument came from the United States,90 ironically the only country, together with Andorra 
and the Holy See, which is not a Party to the CBD today.91 
The three objectives of the CBD reflect the set of competing interests that emerged during the nego-
tiations. These competing interests aligned along a North-South split and reflected conflicting ideas 
as regards where the emphasis of the CBD should lie: conservation or use; access to genetic resources 
or benefit sharing. These competing interests were further reflected in the discussions regarding the 
legal characterization of biodiversity. Delegations discussed many of the articulation of the concept 
of commons during the pre-negotiating phase, and namely common heritage, common responsi-
bility, common interest and common concern. The concept of common heritage was, however, very 
quickly problematized as it was understood to entail certain legal implications that were deemed 
unacceptable, by developing countries in particular, as it was seen to impinge on their sovereignty 
over what were forcefully defended as domestic resources.92 It was eventually the notion of common 
concern that gained consensus.93
89  Decision 14/26 ‘Rationalization of international conventions on biological diversity’ in UNEP, Report of The Governing 
Council on the Work of its Fourteenth Session, 8-19 June 1987, General Assembly Official Records: Second Session Supple-
ment No. 25 (A/42/25). 
90  Fiona McConnell, The Biodiversity Convention. A Negotiating History (Kluwer Law International 1996) 5. 
91  The US has signed but not ratified the CBD. However, the US participates to the work of the CBD. The main point of 
contention for the US was the question of intellectual property rights; see in this respect eg R Jajakumar Nayar and David 
Ong, ‘Developing Countries, “Development” and the Conservation of Biological Diversity’ in Michael Bowman and Catherine 
Redgewell (eds), International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law International 1996).
92  ibid.
93  It was indeed considered a ‘fundamental principle’ that ‘the conservation of biological diversity was a common concern 
of all people. This principle required the participation of all countries and all peoples in a global partnership. It implied inter-
generational equity and fair burden sharing. The common concern called for a balance between the sovereign rights of nations 
to exploit their natural resources and the interests of the international community in global environmental protection’, Report 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Biological Diversity on the Work of its Second Session (7 
March 1991) UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/2/5, 4 [17].
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In this respect, MGRs, as one element of biodiversity,94 are a common concern of humankind,95 
even though the precise scope of their definition remains unsettled. Yet their concrete legal regime 
varies significantly according to their bio-geographical and jurisdictional location, as well as with 
their movements across locations.96 According to general international law,97 and to the specific pro-
visions contained in the CBD,98 MGRs located within the territory of a State are subject to its sov-
ereignty. In relation to marine areas outside of the territorial sea, including marine areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, it is, however, UNCLOS that more comprehensively sets out the legal regime 
for MGRs. In this respect, we need to distinguish between several maritime zones. In the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, which extends from the end of the territorial sea and up to 200 nautical miles in a 
seaward direction, coastal States have sovereign rights over living resources in the EEZ.99 It appears 
reasonable that MGRs should be included in the notion of living resources,100 and thus be subject to 
the same legal regime.
Concerning resources located in the continental shelf,101 States have exclusive sovereign rights only 
for mineral and other non-living natural resources and for sedentary living resources (Article 77), 
albeit different obligations exist in relation to the so-called extended continental shelf, that is, that 
portion of the continental shelf which extends beyond the 200 nautical miles limit.102 To the extent 
that genetic material is embedded in sedentary species, States have then exclusive rights of exploita-
tion. However, is it not inconceivable that there may exist species that are not sedentary within the 
meaning of the definition of sedentary species contained in Article 77, and yet still belong to the 
seabed, rather than to the water column (in which case they would be subject to the regime of the 
relevant section of the water column, i.e. territorial sea or EEZ). In that case, it becomes essential to 
determine the applicable regime. 
94  CBD art 2.
95  Or rather, it is their conservation that is a common concern: CBD preamble, recital 3.
96  This is indeed a well-known problem with respect to any marine resources, see eg Jung-Eun Kim, ‘The Incongruity bet-
ween the Ecosystem Approach to High Seas Marine Protected Areas and the Existing High Seas Conservation Regime’ (2013) 
2 Aegean Review of the Law of the Sea and Maritime Law 36.
97  eg the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
98  eg Art 15, which recognizes ‘the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the authority to determine access 
to genetic resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national legislation’.
99  However, these rights over marine living resources entail corresponding duties, such as the promotion of their ‘optimum 
utilization’ (art 56), and the duty to assume responsibility for their conservation through, primarily, determining a total al-
lowable catch (art 61). If, moreover, Coastal States do not utilize the catch quota in full, they are obliged to give other States 
access to the remaining surplus (art 62(2)).
100  Thus, also Petra Drankier and others, ‘Marine Genetic Resources in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Access and 
Benefit-Sharing’ (2012) 27 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 375, 399-400.
101  That is, that portion of the ocean floor and subsoil beyond the territorial sea and within the EEZ boundary.
102  See especially UNCLOS art 82, which requires coastal States to ‘make payments or contributions in kind’ as a condition 
for the exercise of their sovereign rights of exploitation of the resources of the shelf. 
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The remaining maritime zones are located beyond national jurisdiction. Both are global commons, 
yet their legal regimes are significantly different. The Area is subject to a regime of common heritage 
under Part XI of UNCLOS.103 This regime regulates the access to, and the sharing of benefits from 
seabed mining activities. In fact, the term ‘resources’ is specifically taken to mean, for the purposes 
of Part XI, ‘all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources,’ whether ‘at or beneath’ the seabed (Article 
133). It would appear, therefore, that MGRs, being living resources, are not encompassed by the com-
mon heritage regime, and are thus subject to the regime of the high seas (i.e. freedom). This is indeed 
the opinion of a number of commentators,104 and of a number of delegations within the context of the 
ongoing BBNJ negotiations.105 However, the question remains debated,106 and other scholars suggest 
that MGRs are subject to the common heritage regime.107 I will not rehearse the arguments here.108 
It is, however, useful to underline how both the Area and its resources are common heritage of man-
kind.109 In that respect, it can be suggested that the regime of the Area, defined as common heritage 
independently from its resources (which for the purposes of UNCLOS are mineral resources), ex-
tends naturally to other resources it may contain, save the fact that those other resources do not fall 
under the specific regime governing mineral resources under Part XI. Indeed, as Oude Elferink ob-
serves, the definition of the term resources as mineral resources may be valid for the purposes of Part 
XI only, rather than generally.110 In other words, there exist arguments supporting both positions.
103  Indeed, the ‘Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind’ (art 136).
104  See eg WT Burke, ‘State Practice, New Ocean Uses, and Ocean Governance under UNCLOS’ in Thomas Mensah (ed), 
Oceans Governance: Strategies and Approaches for the 21st Century (Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii 1996) 
231; Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, Manchester University Press 1999) 239, in whose opi-
nion both living and other non-mineral resources remain outside of the regime of the Area, and a such subject to the high seas 
regime, fn 49. Further on the different positions see Youna Lyons and Denise Cheong, ‘The International Legal Framework 
for the Protection and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity’ in Charles McManis and Burton Ong (eds), Routledge 
Handbook of Biodiversity and the Law (Routledge 2017) 73-74.
105  Indeed, MGRs, their legal status and the relevant legal regimes are among the most contentious issues in the BBNJ pro-
cess, see eg PREPCOM Report (n 7) particularly Section B.
106  The existence of ‘divergent views’ on the matter was indeed reported by the Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc Open-en-
ded Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, UN Doc A/63/79 [36], and divergence is still a key element of the BBNJ process, especially in 
relation to the legal status of MGRs, see in particular PREPCOM Report (n 7) particularly Section B.
107  See eg Tullio Scovazzi, ‘The Concept of Common Heritage of Mankind and the Genetic Resources of the Seabed beyond 
the Limits of National Jurisdiction’ (2007) XIV:25 Agenda Internacional 11; Drankier and others (n 100); Alex Oude Elferink, 
‘The Regime of the Area: Delineating the Scope of Application of the Common Heritage Principle and Freedom of the High 
Seas’ (2007) 22(1) International Journal of Marine and Costal Law 143. Others recognize the usefulness of the common heri-
tage framework in relation to living resources of the Area, thus eg Tullio Treves, ‘Protection of the Environment on the High 
Sea and in Antarctica’ in Kalliopi Koufa (ed), Protection of the Environment for the New Millennium (Sakkoulas Publications 
2002) esp 91.
108  The reader is referred to the clearest exposition of this argument, namely Oude Elferink (n 107).
109  UNCLOS art 136.
110  For a fully developed argument in this sense, see Oude Elferink (n 107) See especially his remark that art 145(b) UN-
CLOS mentions ‘natural resources’ hence suggesting that there are resources of the Area besides and beyond the ‘mineral 
resources’ defined in art 133, ibid 152, fn 33. Elferink also makes the argument that art 133 ‘does not provide that PART XI is 
only applicable to mineral resources’ (ibid 152), and that the definition of the term resources is not exhaustive (ibid 152). See 
also Drankier and others (n 100) esp 402-03.
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The high seas maritime zone is a residual notion111 and is governed by a regime of freedom.112 
MGRs that are located in the water column of the high seas are thus logically subject to a regime of 
freedom (indeed two activities that are directly relevant, albeit in different ways, for MGRs are ex-
plicitly listed among the high seas freedoms in Article 87: fishing and marine scientific research). We 
are thus faced with many different regimes applicable to the same resource (MGRs) according to its 
location. Additionally, as already noted, the location of MGRs is dynamic, in a variety of senses. In 
relation to the general capacity for motion of the relevant organisms, MGRs may appear in different 
maritime zones, as they move or straddle across them. MGRs may also migrate from maritime zone 
to maritime zone throughout their life cycle, or their regime may depend on the particular stages at 
which they relevant organisms are harvested.113 This dynamism, moreover, may entail iterative cross-
ings between maritime zones in a multiplicity of senses: from various areas beyond to various areas 
within national jurisdiction, as well movements between different areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(eg between the water column and the ocean floor, or vice versa). 
What has emerged thus far is that the legal regime of MGRs is quite heterogeneous. However, as 
already underlined, MGRs are, regardless of their particular location or legal regime, the common 
concern of humankind, and as such remain enfolded within the narrative of the commons. The con-
cept of common concern, moreover, may serve, to some extent, to render the lack of homogeneity 
between legal regimes less problematic, as it introduces a need to balance sovereign rights to exploit 
MGRs and common interests to their conservation, and, arguably, to the adoption of equitable ben-
efit sharing arrangements. As already mentioned in the introduction, common concern introduces a 
public dimension to the otherwise traditionally private-law inspired inter-state architecture of inter-
national (environmental) law.114 An additional aspect that it is useful to mention is that some com-
mentators suggest that common concern is but a manifestation, or an articulation of the principle of 
common heritage, with an operational scope limited to resources under the sovereignty of a State.115 
And while it is important to reiterate how common concern refers more precisely to the conservation 
of biodiversity (and thus of MGRs), MGRs remain in various ways enfolded within the narrative of 
the commons, and this circumstance has indeed specific though variable,116 legal implications. 
In addition to the variety of legal regimes applicable to MGRs in accordance with their physical 
location, a further set of complexities must be briefly presented. There exist problematic lines of de-
marcation that in a number of cases make the neat determination of the geographical and legal space 
111  The high seas encompass ‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or 
in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State’, UNCLOS art 86.
112  UNCLOS art 87.
113  As is the case, for example, in relation to sedentary species, whose definition as sedentary species is linked to a characte-
ristic (their location and mobility) at a particular life stage, that is, ‘at the harvestable stage’, UNCLOS art 77(4).
114  Holland famously observed how the ‘Law of Nations is but private law writ large’: Thomas Holland, Studies in Interna-
tional Law (Clarendon Press 1898) 151; Lauterpacht would further expose the depth of this private law pedigree in his seminal 
Herst Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (Longman Greens and co. 1927).
115  Baslar (n 39).
116  In relation to scope and intensity of this enfolding. See French (n 19) for some preliminary reflections, not as regards 
MRGs specifically, but more broadly on the potential legal value of common concern.
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that defines the legal regime of MGRs quite difficult. Some of these problematic lines of demarcation 
are geographical and/or jurisdictional. Others are related to the nature of the activities relevant to the 
harvesting of MGRs. Finally, others relate to the material substrate of the resource and its different 
legal characterization. 
The first set of problematic lines of demarcation relates to geographical and jurisdictional fragmen-
tation. The key issues are whether, to which extent and under which conditions it is possible to pre-
cisely locate MGRs in a particular maritime zone. This is, as we have seen, an important question, as 
the location determines the applicable legal regime. As we have seen, movements between maritime 
zones already pose some problems. However, even more problematic are those cases where ascer-
taining whether a particular spatial area is, for example, part of the high seas or of the ocean floor, is 
difficult. One first example relates to hydrothermal vents.117 Hydrothermal vents are characterized by 
large chimneys formed by the precipitation of the minerals contained in the so-called ‘smokers’, that 
is plumes of mineral-rich water that are expelled upwards from beneath the seafloor. Heated water 
may additionally also appear as diffuse flow of fluids that surrounds the vent field. There is a clear dif-
ference in the chemical composition between vent fluids and the surrounding seawater. Importantly, 
the large majority of the very specialized fauna that is to be found in hydrothermal vents ecosystems 
is localized where seawater and vent fluids mix. In this respect, it may not be entirely straightforward 
to establish whether organisms found in the extreme ecosystems of hydrothermal vents belong to the 
seabed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof, or to the superjacent water column, as the distinction be-
tween the latter and the gas chimneys of hydrothermal vents is not, from a legal perspective, entirely 
clear.118 Additionally, some commentators argue that minerals found in the smokers belong to the 
Area,119 which would lead to the conclusion that living organisms found in the smokers would have 
to belong to the Area also.
A similar question arises in relation to brine pools. Delineating a clear distinction between the wa-
ter column and ocean brine pools located on the ocean floor, whose waters remain separated from 
the water column due to differences in salinity and density, may also not be straightforward, and 
indeed such separated waters may be considered to belong to the ocean floor. If that were to be the 
case, MGRs located in such brine pools would fall under the regime of the Area. Similar yet distinct 
questions arise in relation to the delineation of boundaries between maritime zones, for example 
between the high seas water column and the extended continental shelf or between the extended 
continental shelf and the Area.
These questions have been explored before in the literature,120 so my aim here is not to articulate a 
novel argument, but rather that of illustrating the type of complexities that affect the legal status and 
regime of MGRs. Importantly, these interactions between different maritime zones, with distinct and 
incommensurable legal regimes, and especially the one between the extended continental shelf and 
117  The information of hydrothermal vents contained in this section are based on Maria C Baker and others, ‘An environ-
mental perspective’ in WWF/IUCN (eds), The Status of Natural Resources on the High Seas (WWF/IUCN 2001) 15-16.
118  See eg Drankier and others (n 100) 406ff. 
119  Thus, Burke (n 104) 231.
120  See especially Oude Elferink (n 107) and Drankier and others (n 100).
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the high seas, have been indeed highlighted as one of the areas that will define the future develop-
ment of the law of the sea.121 
Another line of demarcation that makes the delineation of a clear legal regime for MGRs difficult, 
having particularly in mind the benefit sharing architecture that should frame the exploitation of 
MGRs, is the line that separates marine scientific research and bioprospecting. This question has 
been debated at length in the literature,122 but there remain crucial uncertainties as regards both 
marine scientific research and bioprospecting, in terms of delineating the boundaries between the 
two activities, as both lack a clear and uniformly accepted definition.123 This delineation is important 
to the extent that marine scientific research in ABNJ enjoys a regime of freedom,124 while biopros-
pecting is being discussed in the BBNJ process with a view to adopting a regulatory framework con-
cerning (mainly to restrict) access and establish rules for the sharing of benefits.125 Yet distinguishing 
between them – for example in terms of ‘pure’ scientific research and ‘applied’ scientific research 
– may prove very difficult,126 or even impossible.127 
A third, and final, line of demarcation that can be mentioned before moving on to drawing some 
concluding reflections, is the one that relates to the delineation of resources, and more precisely 
between fish as a commodity and fish as MGRs. The discussion within the BBNJ process is clearly 
oriented towards establishing a clear distinction between the two, yet the details, and the potential 
implications, are yet to be explored, let alone agreed upon.128
121  Donald R Rothwell and others, ‘Charting the Future for the Law of the Sea’ in Donald R Rothwell and others (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (OUP 2015) 892.
122  See eg Tullio Scovazzi, ‘Protection of the Environment, Scientific Research and Bioprospecting: Some Considerations on 
the Role of the International Sea-Bed Authority’ (2004) 19 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 383; Sharelle 
Hart, ‘Elements of a Possible Implementation Agreement to UNCLOS for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine 
Biodiversity in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2008) IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Papers, Marine Series No 4; 
Louise Angélique de La Fayette, ‘A New Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity and Genetic 
Resources Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction’ (2009) 24 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 221.
123  While marine scientific research is addressed in Part XIII of UNCLOS, there is no legal definition. As regards biopros-
pecting, there is no official definition, though the practice is ‘generally understood as the scientific investigation of living 
organisms for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical resources’, de La Fayette (n 122) 228.
124  See UNCLOS arts 256 (for the Area) and 257 (for the high seas), though subject to the limitation of art 240.
125  The regulation of access may indeed apply only in relation to bioprospecting, see Chair’s streamlined non-paper (n 85) 
15, yet if there I no practical way to distinguish between the two, any regulation may prove pointless.
126  Hart (n 122) 16.
127  Scovazzi for example maintains that ‘it impossible to establish a clear-cut distinction between one activity and the other 
and between one purpose and the other. A research endeavour organized with the intent to increase human knowledge may 
well result in the discovery of commercially valuable information and vice versa’: Scovazzi (n 107) 18.
128  eg in the Chair’s streamlined non-paper (n 85) fish is addressed in two parts, under ‘use of terms’ (‘Definition must take 
into account the distinction between fish used for its genetic properties and fish as a commodity’), and under ‘material scope’ 
(in relation to ‘Fish and other biological resources used for research on their genetic properties’ it is suggested that a ‘scientifi-
cally-informed threshold would be established, whereby if a particular (fish) species is extracted or harvested for the purpose 
of bioprospecting for marine genetic resources beyond a certain amount (depending on species and habitat variability), it 
would be considered a commodity. Such threshold could be elaborated by a scientific/technical body under the instrument’), 
respectively 7 and 14.
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5. Conclusions 
In this article, I have endeavoured to explore some of the ways in which MGRs are conceptually 
and normatively enfolded within, and articulated through, the concept of commons. Indeed, we have 
seen how what I have reframed as the narrative of the commons traverses and envelops MGRs in a 
multiplicity of ways. However, regardless of the consideration of MGRs as a commons, or the ways in 
which the narrative of the commons enfolds MGRs, it is also important to understand the particular 
legal regime underlying any one inflection of the narrative of the commons with respect to MGRs. 
The article has thus also endeavoured to show how these two dimensions have a variable relation, 
and that the narrative of the commons, and some of its underlying concepts, are linked in complex 
ways to a variety of legal categories and legal regimes. The latter in particular vary, even significantly, 
in relation to the physical and legal localization of MGRs in diverse maritime zones, a location that, 
moreover, may vary over time for the same organism. Two questions remain, however. The first is 
whether the heterogeneity of legal regimes is, in fact, a problem. In other words, the question is 
whether the legal regime of MGRs should be determined exclusively by the maritime zone where 
MGRs are located, or whether, by contrast, the nature of the resource should determine the appro-
priate legal regime regardless of the maritime zone(s) where it is found. The second question relates 
to whether it is either possible, or useful, to bring MGRs under one inflection of the narrative of the 
commons, and if so, which one.
As we have seen, there are many perspectives from which to approach the question of the legal 
status of MGRs, as well as a divergence of views among both legal scholars and States. Indeed, the sys-
tematization and harmonization of the legal regime of MGRs is both difficult theoretically and con-
troversial politically. What is arguably needed, is a practically useful and theoretically sound notion 
capable of articulating a coherent yet sufficiently flexible legal framework. The principle of common 
concern may be one such idea.129 More than any other inflection of the narrative of the commons, in 
fact, common concern seems capable of accommodating most, if not all, the tensions inherent in the 
complex issues raised by MGRs. Both the (potential or actual) multiplicity of legal regimes and the 
difficult delineation of the MGRs in the boundary areas discussed at the end of the previous section 
can be addressed from the perspective of common concern, given its neutral stance as regards ques-
tions of title and/or sovereignty. 
As already mentioned, MGRs (or rather, the conservation of biodiversity of which they are one 
constitutive element) are already a common concern of humankind. The advantage of utilizing the 
principle of common concern in relation to MGRs is that it is, in part, already applicable. Moreover, 
common concern has a broad scope, and can more easily include the multiplicity of legal regimes 
that are (potentially or actually) already associated with MGRs in the various maritime zones. Be-
cause the question of title is not relevant for the purposes of characterizing a resource as a common 
129  As argued for example by one of IUCN’s submission to the PREPCOM process, where the principle of common concern 
was put forward as a ‘pragmatic solution’, IUCN Intervention on applicable principle to Marine Genetic Resources, PREP-
COM 3.
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concern (nor for the legal effects of such characterization to be effective), common concern is thus 
able to accommodate otherwise problematic state changes (eg the transition from juvenile to har-
vestable stages relevant for the legal regime of sedentary species), as well as movements across mar-
itime zones, and, finally, situations where the association with one or another maritime zone is un-
clear, difficult to determine or controversial (such as the case of hydrothermal vents or brine pools).
Other advantages of the principle of common concern are that it is able to articulate a balance 
between the sovereign rights of nations to exploit their natural resources and the interests of the 
international community in global environmental protection, though this particular aspect is not so 
pressing for resource located in ABNJ. Moreover, and this is indeed an important aspect of common 
concern, the principle is a key element of a broader process of publicization of international (environ-
mental) law. According to Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, the concept of common concern has a crucial 
function towards the globalization of the scope and normative reach of international environmental 
law, which it can no longer be characterized ‘as simply a system governing transboundary relations 
among neighbouring States.’130 Similarly, Judge Weeramantry emphasized how international envi-
ronmental law must be always put in relation to ‘global concerns of humanity as a whole.’131 In this 
respect, common concern is a key element in the already mentioned process where ‘common-interest 
normative patterns’ are gaining traction vis-à-vis more traditional ‘inter-state normative patterns’.132
Considering MGRs as common concern may be beneficial from the particular point of view of 
conservation vis-à-vis the variety of legal regimes that may obtain in the different maritime zones. 
However, it must be kept in mind that from the point of view of resource extraction and exploitation, 
as already observed,133 common concern may fall short of satisfying the political aims and legal 
requirements for a regime of access and benefit sharing.
These questions, however, cannot be settled here. By way of conclusion then, it shall be sufficient to 
observe how, like international law more broadly, MGRs are traversed by a multiplicity of conceptual 
and normative vectors that reproduce the tensions that exist between a narrative of the commons 
and a narrative of resource ownership or sovereignty, between the communis and the proprium. The 
same tensions are present and are under discussion within the context of the BBNJ process, and it 
is certainly a possibility that the legal regime applicable to MGRs that will be adopted in the new 
agreement will be heterogeneous, and treat MGRs located in the Area and those located in the high 
seas differently. Yet, in both cases, MGRs will inevitably intersect with the narrative of the commons, 
and that may facilitate a common architecture for benefit sharing, if not of access, and rules aimed at 
conserving MGRs as a common concern of humankind.
130  Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (OUP 2009) 130.
131  Gabčikovo-Nagymaros (n 2), Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, 115.
132  Hey (n 3) 552.
133  Morris-Sharma (n 77) 90.
